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The Etiology of the Occurrence of En Banc Review
in the U.S. Court of Appeals
Micheal W. Giles Emory University
Virginia A. Hettinger University of Connecticut
Christopher Zorn University of South Carolina

Todd C. Peppers Roanoke College

The U.S. Courts of Appeals, working principally through three-judge panels, constitute important final arbiters of the
meaning of the federal constitution, laws, and regulations and, hence, significant policymakers within the federal system.

En banc rehearing-reconsideration of the decision of a three-judge panel by the full complement ofjudges appointed to the
circuit-is an institutional device that ensures circuit decisions are in line with the established preferences of the circuit. The

use of en banc varies in frequency across circuits and within circuits over time. Drawing on legal, attitudinal, and strategic
perspectives of judicial behavior, we develop and test a set of integrated expectations regarding the causes of this variation.
Our analysis finds support for the operation of all three models and suggests that the influence of ideology on the use of en

banc in the recent era is not unique but part of a long-standing pattern.

On September 15, 2003, a three-judge panel of the

year, the Courts of Appeals, working principally through

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit over-

three-judge panels, render decisions that affect how elec-

turned a decision by a U.S. District Court and

tions are conducted, how business is regulated, and the

postponed the recall election for the governor of Califor-

limits of government encroachment on the rights of indi-

nia.' This decision by three of the circuit's more liberal

viduals. These decisions are subject to appeal to the U.S.

judges was viewed by commentators as a boon to theelec-

Supreme Court, but such review is currently exercised in

toral prospects of the sitting governor, Gray Davis. For

fewer than 70 cases a year, far less than one-tenth of 1%

the overwhelming majority of cases decided by the U.S.

of the cases decided by the Courts of Appeals. Thus, the

Courts of Appeals, the decision of the three-judge panel
constitutes the final decision in the case. In the Califor-

U.S. Courts of Appeals constitute important final arbiters
of the meaning of the federal constitution, laws, and reg-

nia recall case, however, a majority of the active judges

ulations and, hence, significant policymakers within the

on the Ninth Circuit voted to vacate the panel decision

federal legal system.

and to rehear the case sitting en banc.2 On September 23,

The California case also highlights the problem inherent in a central institutional component of the U.S.

2003, the en banc panel unanimously affirmed the District Court judge's finding against the plaintiffs, and the
recall election occurred as scheduled.

The California recall case highlights the political and

Courts of Appeals-the use of three-judge panels. The
decisions of three-judge panels constitute precedent binding on both U.S. District Courts and future panels within

legal significance of the decisions of the U.S. Courts of Ap- the circuit in which they are rendered. This is an efficient

peals. In this case, and in many far less visible cases each

arrangement for processing cases, as it allows subsets of

Micheal W. Giles is professor of political science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 (mgiles@emory.edu). Virginia A. Hettinger is
professor of political science, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 (virginia.hettinger@uconn.edu). Christopher Zorn is professor
of political science, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 (zorn@sc.edu). Todd C. Peppers is professor of public affairs,

Roanoke College, Salem, VA 24153 (peppers@roanoke.edu).
'Southwest Voter Registration Education Project et al. v. Kevin Shelley, California Secretary of State, 344 E3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003).

2In the Ninth Circuit the rehearing en banc traditionally occurred before 10 randomly selected active judges plus the Chief Judge of the
Circuit. In January 2006, the number of judges was changed to 14 judges plus the Chief Judge. We discuss the use of this "mini-en banc"
procedure at greater length below.
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greater
use of en banc review, calling it 'a stabilizing
the judges assigned to the circuit to act with make
finality
on

behalf of the whole.3 However, as scholars process
have noted,
that makes sure the majority's voice is heard' "
(Note
1989,
n. 3).7
this institutional design creates the possibility
that
panAttempts
to assess the ideological conflict explanation
els will produce circuit law that is contrary to the
preffor
variation
in
erences of a majority of the judges appointed to a cir-the occurrence of en bancs, however, have

cuit (Abramowicz 2000; Atkins 1972; Van Winkle
produced1996).
mixed results. Solimine, examining en banc decisionsbefore
across all circuits in the years 1985-87, concluded
En banc rehearing-reconsideration of the case

that the datato
did not "... support the charge that the
the full or a larger complement of judges appointed
the circuit-is the institutional device employed
Reagan-appointed
by the judges are using the en banc procedure
as anproideological tool" (1988, 63). In contrast, Banks
Courts of Appeals to respond to this possibility.
This

(1997),
focusing
on a single Court of Appeals, the D.C.
cedure was first approved by the U.S. Supreme
Court
in
19414 and subsequently confirmed by Congress,
Circuit,
through
for a longer period of time, found strong evidence
statute, in 1948.s
for the operation of ideological conflict in the occurrence
en banc of
review. A note in the Harvard Law Review
En banc rehearing only occurs in a limited of
number
(1989)
concurs with Banks' finding for the D.C. Circuit.
cases each year. For example, while the Courts
of Appeals

Employing
decided nearly 27,000 cases after oral argument
or sub-a slightly longer time period than Solimine
(1988),
it finds
mission of briefs in 1999, only 94 cases, less than
1%,
werethat the use of en banc increased in circuits

Reagan
decided en banc in that year. While uniformly where
low, the
in-appointees gained the majority.8
Extant
studies
have also suffered from a number of
cidence of en banc varies significantly both across circuits
and within circuits across time. For example, shortcomings.
in 1999 theThose studies have focused either on a few
First and Second Circuits decided only two cases
circuits
en for
banc
a relatively brief period of time or on single
longer periods of time. Either approach, while
while the Ninth Circuit employed en banc 22 circuits
times;for
since
1980 the use of en banc review in the Court ofproviding
Appealsuseful
for information, raises concerns about the

the District of Columbia has ranged from as few
generalizabilty
as two of the findings. For example, the Court of
in 1992 to as many as 10 in 1983.6

Appeals for the District of Columbia is often cited as an es-

What explains this variation across circuits
pecially
and time
important court both in terms of the significance
in the use of en banc rehearing? Previous studies
of the
addresscases that it hears and the prominence of the judges

that
have
served on it (including four current members
ing this question are relatively few in number
and
have
of ideological
the U.S. Supreme Court; Banks 1997, 1999). Given the
focused principally on assessing the role of
conflict. Claims that en banc review was used to
enforce
policy
saliency of the cases it hears and the strong ideological in
divisions
circuit ideological discipline reached a fever pitch
the that have characterized its members, the

D.C.
Circuit would seem to be the most likely venue in
1980s and 1990s as first Reagan and then Bush
appointees
which to
find support for an ideological conflict argument
to the Courts of Appeals produced conservative
circuit
for the
use of en banc. Likewise, studies that focus only on
majorities (Schwartz 1988; Wermiel 1988). The
credibil-

ity of these charges was enhanced by the ideologically
the Reagan era provide valuable insights into causal processes at work in that time period, but are unable to speak
driven judicial recruitment of the Reagan administration

to the
issue of whether this was a truly unique episode,
and by the heightened ideological conflict that
accompanied recruitment to the lower federal courts in the adas critics implied, or merely a continuation of business as
ministrations of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush

usual in the Courts of Appeals.

(Goldman 1997). Moreover, some Reagan appointees to

Second, with few exceptions extant studies have fo-

the bench openly espoused the ideological use of en banc.

cused almost solely on the role of judicial ideology. As a

For example, "Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit

result, they have not given sufficient attention to alter-

urged the Reagan-appointed majority on that court to native explanations for variation in the use of en bancs.
In particular, those studies that have not supported the
3Note, however, that from the perspective of the circuit as a whole,
this arrangement may not be efficient with respect to creating effi- 7Some Reagan judges, however, also spoke against such use of en
cacious policy (cf. Shavell 1995, 2006).
banc. Kenneth Ripple of the Seventh Circuit stated that "(C)ertainly,
4 Textile Mills Securities Corporation v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326

(1941).

528 U.S.C. 46.
6These figures are based on our data on en banc rehearings, which
we describe more fully below.

no member of the court believes, I hope, that an en banc proceeding

may be used as a vehicle to permit judges to further their own
ideological predilections" Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1179 (7th
Cir.1987), cited in Solimine (1988, n. 16).
8For a somewhat more complex result, see Giles, Walker, and Zorn

(2006).
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critically thein
judges serving
a particular
circuit.
A majority
ideology
the
use
of
the

not

provided
vote of active judges
the
in a circuit
reader
is required to grant
with
review.

other

plausible
Our purpose in thisexplanations.
article is to explain variation in the

d
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adopted
relatively
frequency
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models
of judicial behavior
and derive their
implications
consider
how
strategic

for theand
occurrence of
en banc rehearing.
upon
condition

the

ideology.

the

present

study

what causes the observed variation in the occurrence of

we

reexamine

the

The Attitudinal Model

en banc review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Unlike previ-

ous studies, we examine the occurrence of en bancs across The basis for the so-called "attitudinal model" of judicial
all circuits and across a broad sweep of time, from 1942

behavior lies in the notion that in making their rulings,

to 1999. Moreover, we address this question by systemati-

judges are driven by their desire to implement their pol-

cally developing and assessing expectations derived from

icy preferences into law, subject to the constraints in the

three alternative models of judicial behavior: attitudinal,

case before them. Judicial decisions are thus seen as a re-

strategic, and legal. Thus, the present study provides the sult of the intersection of case context (party and issues)
first theoretically rigorous, comprehensive assessment of and the ideological preferences of the judges (Segal and
the causes of intercircuit and temporal variation in the
use of en banc.
Our study is therefore important for at least two rea-

Spaeth 2002). Myriad studies have supported this model
by documenting the operation of policy preferences in the

behavior of both Supreme Court justices and the judges

sons. First, scholars have long recognized that agenda set- of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Viewed through the lens of the attitudinal model, the
ting is a crucial stage in the policy process (Bachrach and
Baratz 1962; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995;

decision to grant en banc review reflects the desire of a

Schattschneider 1960). Among studies of the courts, con-

majority of the judges on a circuit to move a panel out-

sideration of this phenomenon has been confined largely

come closer to its preferred policy position. While the

to work on the decision to grant certiorari in the U.S. attitudinal model predicts a causal linkage between the
Supreme Court (e.g., Caldeira and Wright 1988; Caldeira,

ideological makeup of a circuit and the occurrence of en

Wright, and Zorn 1999; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; banc review, the nature of that linkage admits at least two
Pacelle 1991; Perry 1991; Ulmer 1984). As a rule, review possible forms. First, the linkage could be relatively con-

by lower federal courts is nondiscretionary so long as tinuous. The attitudinal model predicts that judges whose
threshold criteria such as jurisdiction and standing are preferences are in the minority on a circuit will nonethemet. The granting of rehearing en banc is thus a relatively less vote sincerely (that is, in favor of their most-preferred

rare opportunity to study discretionary agenda setting outcome) and according to those preferences. When they
in the lower federal courts. Second, while more broadly

constitute the majority of a three-judge panel (that is, on

framed than previous studies, the results of our analysis

"majority-minority" panels), such sincere, policy-based

speak directly to the continuing political controversy over voting will yield an aggregate decision that conflicts with
the selection of lower federal court judges, including those the preferences of the circuit majority-one that is ripe for

staffing the Courts of Appeals. It is well established that en banc review. Thus the attitudinal model suggests that
the more frequent the occurrence of majority-minority

the ideological preferences of lower federal court judges

are linked to their decisions (cf. Rowland and Carp 2000),

panels on a circuit, the greater the expected use of en banc

review by the circuit majority. By extension, the observed
in the use of en banc rehearing, this suggests a much more variation in the occurrence of en banc review across time

but if attitudinal and strategic considerations loom large
explicitly and systematically politicized operation in the
Courts of Appeals than has heretofore been established.

and circuits from the attitudinal perspective may be explained in whole or in part by variation in the ideological
heterogeneity of the circuits and the resulting variation in

Models of Judicial Behavior

and Variation in the Occurrence
of En Banc Review

the occurrence of majority-minority panels.

Second, the linkage between ideological voting and
the occurrence of en banc review might reflect shifts in
the ideological regimes within circuits. For example, in the

1980s-after majority control of the D.C. Circuit shifted
to judges appointed by Republican presidents-Judge PaThe decision to grant en banc rehearing is the end product
of a complicated process that involves many actors, mosttricia Wald of that circuit complained that "traditionally
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This sophisticated behavior can take several forms.
in our Courts of Appeals, the en banc process has been
utilized to test the correctness of new precedents, Majority-minority
as soon
panels may conceal their preferences
and
conform their decisions to the preferences of the ciras they are issued. What is novel in our circuit right
now...
is the increasing resort to en bancs to overrule venerable,
cuit majority, thus avoiding en banc rehearing. Alternaheretofore respected circuit precedents. The shift istively,
plainly
minority judges may depart from their preferences

fashion an outcome close enough to the preferred posia symptom of the rapidly changing makeup of theto
court"

(Banks 1999, n. 91). In this view, then, en banc review
is the circuit majority that the policy gains to the cirtion of

not simply a tool to monitor the current activitiescuit
of panmajority of conducting an en banc rehearing will not
offset the associated costs. Finally, the majority-minority
els, but also an instrument for altering long-established
doctrines and precedents in the circuit to reflect the
panel
prefmay produce a result in which its preferred party

wins,
but the decision is deeply embedded in the factual
erences of the new majority. It is this purported use
of en
context of the case, thus reducing the value of the case as
banc review that underlies the controversies surrounding

precedent and reducing the likelihood of en banc review
the emergence of Republican-appointed circuit majorities
in the 1980s.

(Smith and Tiller 2002).

As a result of the potential for sophisticated behavior
The ideological regime change argument thus leads

on banc
the part of judges in the circuit minority, the strategic
to the expectation of a surge in the occurrence of en

perspective
does not expect that variation in ideologireview following a shift in the ideological control of
a circal heterogeneity across time, and circuits will translate
cuit. In particular, it suggests that a change in the partisan
straightforwardly into variation in the occurrence of en
majority of the circuit (say, from liberal to conservative,
rehearings. In fact, given perfect information about
or vice versa) should be followed by an increasebanc
in the
of the judges on the circuit, a simple strateuse of en banc review, as the new circuit majority the
usespreferences
the

model predicts that the minority judges controlling
en banc procedure to overturn previous (and now gic
disfa-

panels would always fashion their decisions in ways to
vored) circuit precedents. Finally, we should emphasize
avoid
en banc review and reversal.'1 Of course, informathat the two attitudinal linkages between ideological
vottion
concerning the policy preferences of the judges on a
ing and en banc review are not mutually exclusive.
Under
this model, variation in the occurrence of en bancs
circuit
may is not perfect. Through the practice of rotating
reflect both variation in the ideological diversity of
panel
a cirmemberships, Courts of Appeals judges interact

cuit and shifts in its ideological regime.

with all other members of the circuit and are likely to
have reasonably good but not perfect information about

The Strategic Model

the preferences of their colleagues."

The presence of imperfect information can con-

tribute to an increase in the likelihood of an en banc
Like the attitudinal model, the strategic model begins with

rehearing in two ways. First, the minority judges con-

the premise that judges have as a central goal the furthertrolling a panel may be more likely to vote sincerely and
ance of their preferred policy positions. It departs from
risk en banc rehearing because imperfect information rethe attitudinal model by emphasizing that judges pursue
sults in uncertainty over the distribution of circuit preftheir policy preferences in a sophisticated manner-that
erences. With perfect information, minority judges know
is, while taking into account the policypreferences of other
they
will lose on en banc rehearing, but imperfect inforrelevant actors and the institutional context in which the

mation makes that outcome less certain (and a sincere
decision is made. While in general evidence for the operation of the strategic model in the Courts of Appeals
is
'oThis simple model considers only a single panel decision with

mixed (e.g., Blackstone and Navarro 2006; Cross and
Tiller
possible
en banc review, thus ignoring the possibility of other influences. For example, it may be the case that the U.S. Supreme
1998; Giles, Walker, and Zorn 2006; but see Hettinger,
Court might support the panel's decision even after en banc reversal, thus rendering sincere behavior more attractive to the panel.

Lindquist, and Martinek 2004; Klein 2002), the en banc

rehearing, which allows the circuit majority to super-

11As a general matter, judges in a circuit are randomly assigned to

vise the wayward tendencies of majority-minority panels,

three-member panels that then hear a set of cases that have also been

is precisely the type of institutional context the straterandomly assigned to that panel; the broad contours of this process
are broadly
laid out in 28 U.S.C. ? 46, while the details can be found
gic model envisions as eliciting sophisticated behavior
to
in the Internal Operating Procedures of each circuit. For example,

avoid review.9

Fourth Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 34.1 states in part that
"(T)he Clerk of Court maintains a list of mature cases available for
oral argument and on a monthly basis merges those cases with a list

of three-judge panels provided by a computer program designed to
9Our test of the strategic model may thus be considered as one
where such behavior is "most likely" to occur.

achieve total random selection."
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One factor that may affect the quality of information concerning circuit preferences is the stability of the
membership of the circuit. In a circuit characterized by

stable membership over several years, the judges will
have interacted more frequently with their colleagues
and thus will have better information about their pol-

icy preferences than will be the case in a circuit with
high membership turnover and shorter tenures. Thus,
whether through greater risk taking or simple prediction
errors by minority judges, a strategic perspective leads us

to expect that circuits with greater instability in mem-

bership will experience a higher frequency of en banc
rehearing.12

Note that to this point our characterization of the

strategic model has assumed the existence of a significant degree of ideological disagreement on the circuit in
question. In fact, the strategic perspective predicts that
membership stability and ideological heterogeneity will
interact in their influence on the frequency of en bancs
in a circuit. That is, while an attitudinal perspective predicts that en bancs will be more frequent in ideologically
heterogeneous circuits than in ideologically homogenous

ones, the strategic model suggests that this difference

will diminish or even disappear with increases in circuit membership stability. This is because as judges on
a circuit serve together longer, their information about
the circuit's aggregate preferences improves in accuracy,
thus allowing them to better avoid making decisions that
might invite en banc review. The negative effect of increases in membership stability on the frequency of en

bancs predicted by the strategic model will be exacerbated by greater circuit heterogeneity. The magnitude of
that negative effect will be small on ideologically homo-

geneous circuits-where en bancs are less likely to occur

in general-and larger on circuits that are ideologically
heterogeneous.

has been linked consistently to the voting of Courts of Appeals judges, but in most of these studies it explains a relatively small percentage of the variation in judicial behavior

(cf. Songer and Haire 1992; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire
2000). Even when the traditional measure of judicial ideology, party of the appointing president, is replaced with

more sophisticated measures, the percentage of variance

explained under the most favorable circumstances does
not exceed 20% (Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers 2001). The
overwhelming majority of cases at the Courts of Appeals

are disposed of without dissent, with judges of all ide-

ological persuasions coming to the same decision. Even
Segal and Spaeth (2002), the chief emissaries of the attitu-

dinal school, allow that below the Supreme Court factors
other than attitudes may influence the decision making
of judges.
One set of such factors captured in the operation of
the legal model is law and legal reasoning. This view asserts

that the high levels of unanimity observed in decisions of

the Courts of Appeals arise despite ideological diversity
because the application of relatively clear rules to relatively
clear factual settings results in a single, clearly appropriate

outcome (Edwards 1998). This view is bolstered by the
reality that absent agenda controls, the caseload of the
Courts of Appeals includes a large number of relatively
pro forma cases.
In the classic model of legal decision making, the only

sources of disagreement between two judges confronted
with the same set of case facts are either error in the identification of the appropriate rule or poor legal reasoning.
While these sources of disagreement among judges persist in the more contemporary version of the model, its
more realistic treatment of the ambiguity of language, the

existence of multiple relevant but not controlling precedents, and the flexible nature of legal reasoning, admit to

the possibility that competent judges, reasoning well and
in good faith, can come to different conclusions regard-

ing the same case (Cross 1997; Edwards 1998). Some of
these differences may reflect differences in judicial ideol-

12The longer judges serve together, the better internalized are circuit norms. But norms themselves can vary in their favorableness
toward en bancs across circuits and over time. So longer average
tenure on a circuit is consistent with both increased information

ogy, but they may also reflect systematic differences in the

weights that judges give to precedents from different cir-

cuits, approaches to treatment of language, and so forth.

and enhanced socialization, but absent a priori knowledge of circuit In short, judges may simply vary in their practice of the
norms regarding en banc, it is reasonable to attribute the expectalegal model.
tion that longer average tenure will condition the affect of attitudes
Quite different expectations regarding the occurrence
on the frequency of en bancs to the strategic effects of increased
information.
of en banc review arise if judges of the Courts of Appeals
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are assumed to be employing the legal model than if theyor significant issues.14 In general, while the mix of cases
are employing either the attitudinal or the strategic mod- varies across circuits, it seems reasonable to assume that
els. First, if a legal model is operative, the likelihood of the likelihood of important or significant cases will inconflicting legal interpretations and perspectives can be crease with circuit caseload.'" Thus we expect variation
expected to increase as the number of judges on a circuit in the occurrence of en banc review across time and cirincreases. If there are systematic differences among judgescuits to be driven by similar variation in circuit caseloads.
in their application of the legal model, then the likelihood A positive relationship between caseloads and the use

that such differences will arise and produce conflicts in- of en banc may also reflect organizational realities. The

creases as the number of judges increases (Abramowiczstress of higher caseloads may simply yield more errors by

2000; Ginsburg and Falk 1991; Howard 1981). Even the three-judge panels in need of correction through en banc
Court of Appeals judges interviewed by Wasby (1979) (Abramowicz 2000).
assumed that an increase in the number of judges in a
circuit would necessitate an increased need for en banc

Data

rehearings.13 Importantly, and in contrast to the mod-

els described above, this expectation occurs irrespective
of the preferences of the judges on the circuit-that is,We analyze the expectations derived from the models dein this view it is sheer numbers, rather than ideological scribed above using data on the incidence of en banc rehearings across all 12 circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
heterogeneity, that drive the en banc process.

At the same time, organizational considerations sug- for the period from 1942-the year after the Supreme

gest that the effect of the number of judges in a circuit on Court's validation of the use of en banc-through 1999,
the occurrence of en banc may be nonlinear. As the num-inclusive.16 Our central variable of interest is the incidence

ber of judges on a circuit increases, the costs associatedof en banc cases in each circuit in each year. To measure

with holding an en banc also rise, and the correspond- the number of en banc cases, we identified the judges siting benefits to each judge decrease. The more judges in-

ting in a circuit in a given year and used Lexis-Nexis to

volved in an en banc rehearing, the more cumbersome search for cases containing combinations of four of the
the process (Wasby 1979). Similarly, in their description judges' names. We then examined the cases generated by
of en banc hearings in the years immediately preceding the this search to see if each qualified as an en banc. In doing
division of the Fifth Circuit, Barrow and Walker (1988)

so, our threshold for inclusion was broad; essentially, any

provide a graphic illustration of the difficulties associated case decided by more than three judges was included in the
with en banc review in circuits with larger numbers of list. We repeated this process for each circuit/year using

judges. Moreover, not only are en banc rehearings pro-different combinations of judges' names. Depending on
cedurally cumbersome with large numbers of participat- the number of judges in the circuit, the number of coming judges, but the rewards to the individual judges are binations searched ranged from six to more than a dozen.
also diminished. The larger number of participants means Only in the circuit/years with a small number of judges
less opportunity for any single judge to impact the out- did we examine all possible combinations of judges.17
come significantly. This suggests that while the number
of panel-circuit conflicts may increase geometrically with

'4While the wording differs somewhat from circuit to circuit, the

the number of judges, limited resources and decreasingstated bases upon which a case will be heard en banc are the fol-

returns to participation act as a constraint on granting en lowing: (1) the panel's decision is in conflict with a decision of the
banc. Thus, the effect of the number of judges in a circuitU.S. Supreme Court or a previous decision of the circuit wherein

it arises, or (2) the case is exceptionally significant. While intracircuit conflict takes primacy of place in the rules, available evidence
quently decreasing as the number of judges on the circuit suggests that significance of the case is the dominant consideration
in granting review (Bennett and Pembroke 1985-86; Note 1989).
grows.

is expected to be curvilinear, first increasing but subse-

Second, under the legal model we expect that the "5The fact that arguably some circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit,
judges would take seriously the admittedly vague stan-have
dard for granting review. This standard essentially is that

a higher frequency of important cases is captured by the fixed
effects for circuits included in the analysis.

en bane review will be granted to cases raising important 16For those years in which circuits had only three authorized judge-

ships and en banc rehearing was irrelevant as an oversight institution, the circuits were treated as missing and excluded from the
analysis.

17Since 1966, the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts (AO)
13The logic here is similar to that for the attitudinal model concern-

has reported the number of cases decided en banc. To assess the
ing the emergence of majority-minority panels, but the minority
reliability of our approach, we compared our data to the AO data for
referred to in the legal model is nonideological.

This content downloaded from
132.174.251.59 on Sat, 17 Jul 2021 16:06:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

THE

ETIOLOGY

OF

FIGURE
First

Fifth

EN

1

Second

Sixth

BANC

En
Third

Seventh

REVIEW

Banc

455

Rehearing

Fourth

Eighth

1940 1960 1980 2000 1940 1960 1980 2000 1940 1960 1980 2000 1940 1960 1980 2000

Year

The result of this process is, we believe, the first defini- circuit will influence the frequency with which en banc

tive, comprehensive list of cases decided en banc in the

rehearings occur. Assessing these expectations requires

U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1942 and 1999, inclusive.

that we have measures of the ideological preferences of

Figure 1 plots the annual number of such cases for each

judges and that we know the composition of each circuit

of the 12 circuits. En bancs were comparatively rare in for each year in the study.
the 1940s and 1950s, averaging only one or two per cir-

The party of the appointing president has tradi-

cuit per year. They increase significantly throughout the tionally been the measure employed to estimate the
1960s and 1970s, attaining their highest number shortly ideological preferences of lower federal court judges.
after the division of the Fifth Circuit in 1981; since then, Judges appointed by Democratic presidents are assumed
their numbers have remained more or less constant at six to be more liberal than those appointed by Republican
or seven per circuit per year on average.

presidents, an assumption well supported by empirical
evidence.18 We accordingly employ the party of the ap-

Measuring Ideology

pointing president, as obtained from the Courts of Ap-

peals biographical database, as our measure of judicial
ideology.19

Both the attitudinal model and the strategic model lead

to the expectation that the ideological composition of a
the years 1966 through 1970. If our approach had identified fewer
en bancs than the Administrative Office, this would suggest that our

method failed to identify all of the en bancs that occurred. In fact,
the counts of en bancs generated by our approach were uniformly
greater than those provided by the Administrative Office. George
and Solimine (2001) have also noted the discrepancy between the
actual number of en bancs and the number reported by the AO.
It appears that the AO requests this information from the circuits,
but provides little definition for what qualifies as an en banc, and
uncritically accepts the reported numbers. As a further validity
check, we also compared our list of en banc cases to partial lists
compiled by other scholars; our method identified over 95% of the
en banc cases listed in those studies.

"8The studies supporting this point are legion; Pinello (1999) summarizes them in a comprehensive meta-analysis.

'9Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) developed an alternative approach to measuring judicial preferences that employs the common
space ideological scores of presidents and senators created by Poole
(1998). However, the common space scores for presidents are only
available for Truman forward, which prevents us from measuring

the preferences of a significant number of judges appointed by
Roosevelt who served into the 1960s. As a result, measures of circuit ideological diversity based on the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers

(2001) approach would be systematically biased by missing data for
most circuits until the 1960s. Omitting these circuit/years would
substantially and systematically truncate the time series. Moreover,
while the two indicators of judicial ideology are strongly correlated,
relying on the party of the appointing president provides a better
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The appointment and departure dates for each judge

in that circuit/year. It ranges from 0-for a circuit that

are also available in the biographical database. Thus for in a given year has either one or no minority judges, and
each year it is relatively easy to determine if a judge is

hence no possibility of majority-minority panels-to 0.5,

sitting on a Court of Appeals. The only difficulty comes

indicating that a circuit is evenly divided between judges

when judges are appointed and/or leave during the year. In appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents.23

these instances the seats may remain vacant throughout

Partisan regime change was coded 1 in the year when

the year, may remain vacant most of the year, or may the majority of the judges appointed to a circuit shifted
be filled almost immediately. Moreover, the vacancy may from one party to the other and 0 in all other circuit/years.
occur early in the year or at the very end of the year. To

In the simplest case, regime change occurs when a cir-

address these issues we adopted the rule that if any judges

cuit that in the previous year had consisted of a majority

served less than six months in a calendar year they were

of judges appointed by Republican (Democratic) presi-

treated as not serving in that year. So if judges retired, took

dents, in the current year has a majority of judges ap-

senior status or died before June, or were appointed after

pointed by Democratic (Republican) presidents. A some-

July of a year, those judges were treated as not serving in what more complex pattern occurs when a circuit moves

from having a majority of judges appointed by presi-

that year.20

To measure ideological heterogeneity, we identified

dents of one party one year to an even balance of par-

circuits in each year as having either a majority of judges

tisan appointments. Since an evenly divided court cannot

appointed by a Democratic president, a majority appointed by a Republican president, or an equal parti-

change circuit law, this condition is not treated as a regime

change. From this "neutral" position, a regime change

san division.21 We used standard combinatorial formulae

could only occur if in a subsequent year the majority of

to determine the number of possible majority-minority

the judges on the circuit are appointed by presidents of the

three-judge panels (i.e., majority Democratic panels in

party opposite to that controlling before the court became

Republican majority circuits and majority Republican

equally balanced. Thus, a regime change is only recorded

panels in majority Democratic circuits) expected to oc-

when a shift in the partisan majority on a circuit is
completed.

cur in each circuit/year given the number of majority and

minority judges actively serving.22 Dividing the number

Circuit Stability

of majority-minority panels by the total number of possible three-judge panels in each circuit/year yields the ex-

pected proportion of all possible three-judge panels in a

The strategic approach leads us to expect that increases

circuit/year that are majority-minority panels; an alterna-

in the stability of circuit membership will dampen the

tive interpretation of this measure is as the probability that

positive effects of ideological heterogeneity on the fre-

a randomly constituted panel will be majority-minority
correspondence to the principle concepts of interest in this study
(e.g., regime change and majority-minority panels). Data on the
party of each judge's appointing president come from Zuk, Barrow,
and Gryski (1996); we extended this information for judges appointed after 1994.
20Forty-one judge/years were deleted on this basis. In 10 additional
instances two judges served six months each in the same seat (left

in June, replacement appointed in July). In these instances, the
incumbent was treated as serving the entire year.

210ur approach does not take into consideration the majorityminority panels created by the continuing service of senior judges
on circuits, or of the presence of district court judges sitting by
designation. Since the number of cases in which senior and/or designated judges participate varies considerably, it was not possible to
include this factor in our computation of the partisan heterogeneity

of the circuits. Note, however, that neither senior nor designated
judges vote on whether a case is to be granted en banc review.
22The expected number of majority-minority panels typically does
not occur, since the full complement of possible panels are usually
not employed in a given year. However, our expectation is that,
given random construction of the panels, the actual numbers of
majority-minoritypanels will vary strongly across circuit/years with
the expected number.

quency of en banc rehearings. Drawing on Zuk, Barrow,
and Gryski (1996), we computed the length of service for

each judge in each circuit and include a variable which
measures the years of service for the judge with the median tenure.

Legal/Organizational Factors
Our measure of the number of judges on each circuit re-

lies on Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski (1996); those data allow

us to compute the actual number of judges sitting on a
circuit in any given year. The Administrative Office of the
23Indeed, an alternative measure of circuit ideological heterogeneity is simply the percentage of Democratic or Republican judges
serving on a circuit in a given year "folded" at 50%. This measure
ranges from 0 when a circuit is homogeneous in partisanship to 0.5
when it is evenly split in partisanship. This measure is strongly correlated with our measure based on the frequency of minority panels
(r = 0.92) but does not reflect as well the logic of the attitudinal
argument.
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Statistics

Variable Expectations Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Dependent Variable
Cases Decided
Independent

En

Banc

4.69

4.47

0

29

Variables

Legal/Organizational

In(Caseload)

+

Fifth

Split

Circuit

Limited

En

6.40

Banc

0.92

+/-

+/-

4.84

0.03
0.03

0.17
0.18

8.46

0

1

0

1

Total Number of Judges + 9.20 4.16 3 28
Total Number of Judges Squared - 101.9 115.1 9 784
Attitudinal

Regime Change + 0.06 0.23 0 1
Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) + 0.21 0.15 0 0.50
Strategic
Median

Circuit

Tenure

8.53

3.73

1

23.5

Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) x Median Circuit Tenure - 1.79 1.51 0 10
Note: NT = 600 (N = 12 circuits, T = 50 years, on average).

U.S. Courts provides the authorized number
less,
of we
judgecreate a dummy variable to capture the effect

ships per circuit, but given vacancies, the actual
thenumber
adoption of the mini en banc by the Ninth Circu
of judges sitting provides a better measure of the
potential
This
variable is equal to 0 for every year through

for simple disagreement and of the difficulties
associated
and
1 for 1981 and each following year. Second, in 19

with conducting en banc rehearings. The Administrative
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Eleven
Office of the U.S. Courts' data on the numbers
of cases
Circuit
by dividing the previous Fifth Circuit. We incl

disposed of on hearing or submission provides
a dummy
our base
variable to test the effect of this dramatic s

measure of caseload. This figure is the number
on the
of cases
Fifth Circuit. Our Fifth Circuit split variab

actually resolved after significant investment of
resources
equal
to 0 for all other circuits. For the Fifth, it is equ

by the judges of the circuit. Following standard
0 for
practice,
each year up to and including 1981 and 1 for 19

we employ the natural log of caseload in the analysis
(e.g.,
and each
following year. Data for the Eleventh Circuit

Maddala 1983).

treated as missing in the years prior to 1982.

During this time period two relevant structural
We provide descriptive statistics for all variables a
changes occurred in the Courts of Appeals. First,
summarize
in 1978 the expectations for the attitudinal, str

Congress passed the Omnibus Judgeship Act, which
gic, and
inlegal/organizational models in Table 1. Note t

cluded a provision allowing "mini" en bancsthe
in circuits
key test between the attitudinal and strategic mo

with more than 15 judges. Such mini en bancs
consist
els comes
in our expectation vis-a-vis the interaction
of 10 randomly selected judges plus the Chief
Judge
of
Median
Circuit
Tenure and the probability of a Major

the circuit. As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals
for the
Minority
Panel: under the strategic account, this inte

Ninth Circuit adopted this innovation in August
tion
1980,
ought
butto be strongly negative, while attitudinal th
the first mini en banc rehearings did not occur
suggests
until 1981
that its effect be undifferentiated from 0.

(Hellman 1990). To date, no other circuit has followed
the lead of the Ninth Circuit in adopting this procedure.

Analysis

The expected effect of this change on the incidence of en
banc under the various models is uncertain.24 NonetheOur data are cross-sectional time-series data, representing
12 circuits over periods of 18 to 58 years. Our dependent
24Hellman (1990) argues that since the outcomes from such rehearings will be unpredictable, the adoption of mini en bancs should
decrease the frequency of their use. This is not inconsistent with our
premise that uncertainty will increase en banc use because our fo-

cus is on the behavior of circuit minority judges under uncertainty
rather than on that of the circuit as a whole.
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variable is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 29, with but even with such factors as increases in caseload and the

the majority of observations falling in the range from 0 number of judges controlled, the mini en banc appears to

to 11. The nature of these data leads us to employ the have increased the frequency of en banc hearings in the
method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) (Zorn Ninth Circuit.

2001), assuming a conditional Poisson distribution for
our measure of en banc counts; we adopt an AR(1) specification for the conditional within-unit covariance ma-

Our variables corresponding to the legal/
organizational explanation (that is, caseload and

number of judges) were expected to exert a positive
influence on the number of en banc rehearings. These
cuits, with the First Circuit omitted for identifiability; expectations are strongly supported by the empirical

trix. We also include fixed effects for each of the 12 cir-

these serve as controls for circuit-level factors (e.g., dif- results. Not surprisingly, caseload is highly related to the

ferences in case mix) not expressly incorporated in the occurrence of en bancs; within the ranges of our data,
model.25 For example, some circuits have a practice of an increase of 1,000 cases in a circuit's annual caseload
informally circulating opinions among all the judges on

yields an expected increase of roughly two en banc

the circuit for comments and suggestions. This could have rehearings. The magnitude of the effect for circuit size
the effect of reducing the need for en banc review.26 We is similar, but is as expected, curvilinear; the predicted

report our model estimates in Table 2.

number of en bancs increases as the number of judges

We begin our discussion with the variables captur- in a circuit goes from four to 15, then decreases. With

ing organizational changes in the Courts of Appeals.27 the other variables in the model set at their means, this
With respect to those changes, it is interesting to note corresponds to an increase in the expected number from
that the one most closely associated with circuit work- four to six, with a subsequent decrease back to four.
load issues-the division of the Fifth Circuit-appears to Since the effect of a higher number of judges on the
exhibit no influence on the rate of en bancs. In the years circuit is significant with both attitudinal and strategic
prior to its division the Fifth Circuit averaged 5.5 en bancs variables controlled, this result provides support for the
per year. In the years since the division it has averaged 10.4 operation of nonideological, legal differences among
per year.28 This difference in frequency, however, declines the judges in their decisions regarding granting en banc
and becomes statistically insignificant once the other vari- review.

ables in the model are taken into account. In contrast, the

presence of the limited en banc procedure in the Ninth

We tested two variables for evidence of attitudinal

influences on the number of en banc rehearings. The ef-

Circuit seems to have increased the frequency of en bancs. fect for the first indicator of ideological influence, regime
In the era without the mini en banc the Ninth Circuit av- change, fails to achieve statistical significance. Given the

eraged 3.2 en banc rehearings per year, compared to 9.9

accounts in the literature of increased en banc usage to

after the procedure was adopted. The results in Table 2 accomplish the policy goals of a new regime, we explored
indicate that this mean difference was largely attributable this relationship in considerable detail. First, we created

to changes in the other variables included in the model,

two new indicators of regime change that capture changes
in the frequency of en bancs occurring not only in the year

25The GEE approach with fixed effects thus allows
us tochange,
simultaneof regime
as does our original measure, but also
ously deal with the possibility of residual circuit-level
heterogeneity
changes occurring
one and two years afterwards. These

in en banc counts and temporal dependence within circuits over
measures allow for the possibility that a new ideologitime. Our results are substantively and statistically identical if we
instead estimate either fixed- or random-effects
or
calPoisson
majoritymodels,
may not immediately
exploit its position.29

The
effect of specificaneither of these alternative measures was
if we adopt any of those models with a negative
binomial
tion in place of the Poisson; those results are available upon request

statistically significant when substituted for our original

from the authors.

measure.

26We thank an anonymous reviewer for making us aware of this
Second, existing
practice.
27Note at the outset that the effects of the 11 circuit indicators are

jointly significant (p < .001), indicating that substantial circuitlevel differences in en banc use remain even after controlling for
the variables in our specification. At the same time, the relative
effects of the variables in the model are, in general, stronger than
those for the circuit indicators; a Wald test indicates that the explanatory power of the nine covariates is greater than that of the 11

circuit indicators (X2 = 148.1 and 214.9 with nine and 11 degrees
of freedom, respectively).

28This difference in means is significant at p < 0.01.

speculation on the effec

ological regime changes focuses almost excl

the shift in partisan regimes in the Reagan

29Over the past 20 years the median time from filing in the U.S.
District Courts to final disposition in the Courts of Appeals has
fluctuated around two years (Administrative Office of the Courts,
various years, Table B4). Thus, our longest regime change indicator,
which captures three years, would seem to encompass the potential
for litigants to create new cases to serve the agenda of the new
majority.
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Estimates

of

Variable Estimate (Std. Error) Incident Rate Ratio
(Constant)

In(Caseload)

-1.60
(1.08)

0.36*

-

1.44

(0.16)

Fifth

Circuit

Split

-0.24

0.78

(0.17)
Limited

En

Banc

0.58*

1.78

(0.27)

Total

Number

of

Judges

0.13*

1.14

(0.07)

Total Number of Judges Squared -0.004* 0.996
(0.002)

Regime

Change

-0.04

0.96

(0.09)

Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) 1.53** 4.62
(0.51)

Median

Circuit

Tenure

-0.001

0.999

(0.012)

Pr(Majority-Minority Panel) x Median Circuit Tenure -0.13* 0.88
(0.06)

Second

Circuit

-0.22

0.80

(0.19)
Third

Circuit

Fourth

0.91**

(0.19)
1.07**

Circuit

2.48

2.92

(0.23)
Fifth

Circuit

0.85**

2.32

(0.23)
Sixth

Circuit

-0.28

0.78

(0.23)
Seventh

Circuit

0.20

1.22

(0.14)

Eighth

Circuit

0.71**

Ninth

Circuit

(0.17)

0.41

2.04
1.50

(0.21)
Tenth

Circuit

0.35*

1.41

(0.14)
Eleventh

D.C.

Circuit

Circuit

0.59

(0.32)
0.76**

1.81

2.15

(0.21)
Note: NT = 600. Cell entries are coefficient estimates; robust standard errors are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates p < .05, two

indicate p <.01.

to provide evidence for its operation. To determine if

variable for the appropriate years, multiplying it by the

regime change, while not operative across the full time

existing regime change variable and adding it to the equa-

range of the study, was nonetheless operative in the Rea-

tion in Table 2. We employed a variety of time periods to

gan/Bush era, we estimated regime change effects sep-

capture the Reagan/Bush era, but regardless of the specific

arately for the Reagan/Bush era by creating a dummy

operationalization, the coefficient for the interaction term
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FIGURE 2 Predicted Counts of En Bancs, by Circuit
Heterogeneity and Tenure
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was nonsignificant.30 These results suggest that our find- means (for continuous variables) or medians (for disings with regard to the lack of effect for regime change oncrete covariates). Lighter regions correspond to lower ex-

the frequency of en bancs are generally robust.

pected numbers of en bancs, while darker regions indicate

The second attitudinal variable, ideological hetero- higher numbers. Consistent with the strategic perspecgeneity, performed as anticipated. The expected num- tive, if the probability of a majority-minority panel is 0,
ber of en banc rehearings increases as the likelihood of a then the expected number of en banc rehearings stays
majority-minority panel increase. Conditional on hold-nearly constant, regardless of how stable the membering circuit tenure constant at 0, the expected number of ship of the circuit is. Conversely, if the probability of a
en banc hearings in an evenly divided circuit is 2.1 times majority-minority panel is high (that is, if the circuit is
higher than in a circuit with zero or one minority judges. almost evenly split between Democrats and Republicans),
As explained below, however, this interpretation of the di-the predicted count of en banc rehearings is highly rerect effect of ideological heterogeneity is misleading givensponsive to circuit tenure, with increases in circuit stabilthe inclusion in the model of an interaction effect be-

ity yielding substantial decreases in the occurrence of en

banc rehearings. Similarly, when median tenure is low, the
tween median tenure and ideological heterogeneity. Simpredicted count of en bancs increases substantially with
ilarly, the statistical insignificance of the strategic variable,
median tenure, is also misleading in the presence of theincreases in the probability of a majority-minority panel.
interaction term.

As circuit tenure increases past about 12 years, however,

the relationship grows less positive, and above that level of
A more useful interpretation focuses on the joint
tenure the expected number ofen banc rehearings actually
effects of heterogeneity, median circuit tenure, and the
begins to decrease as a function of circuit heterogeneity.
interaction of the two. Figure 2 provides a graphical

This last result should be taken with some caution; only
interpretation of the influences of these variables. The
contour plot shows the expected number of en banc re-about 13% of the circuit/years included in the study have

median tenure greater than 12 years, and of those 70%
hearings against these two variables over their ranges in
occur prior to 1960. Thus, the slight negative effect identhe data, holding the other covariates constant at the
tified for ideological heterogeneity at high levels of tenure

30Reagan took office in 1981, and Bush left office in 1993; our
rests on a relatively small and temporally specific portion
measures thus ranged from 1983 to 1989 at the shortest to 1983of
the data examined.
1995 at the longest.
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Conclusions

circuits and reduce their size depends in part on whether
one believes that there are cases that should be granted
en banc review that are currently denied because of the

constraint of size.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are increasingly significant

policymakers within the American political system. While
Our findings also provide evidence that variation in
theeffiuse of en bancs across circuits and time is linked to
their use of three-judge panels allows for tremendous

ciencies, it also raises the possibility of decisions and
pol- in the ideological heterogeneity of the circuits.
variation
icy outcomes that do not reflect the views of a majority
of
The influence
of ideological considerations on the use

the judges on a circuit. Rehearing of a panel decision
by banc has been a point of considerable controversy,
of en
but
to date the evidence on this issue has been mixed.
the members of the circuit sitting en banc is the one procedure by which the circuit majority may monitor
Bypanel
contrast, our results leave little doubt that variation
decisions. In the face of steadily declining numbersin
ofthe
deideological heterogeneity of the circuits affects the
cisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the high levels
of
frequency
with which en bancs occur. In general, we find

contentiousness over many Court of Appeals decisions,
the greater the ideological heterogeneity on a circuit, the
the importance of en banc review is arguably greater
thanthe frequency of en bancs. However, we also unhigher
it has ever been in history.
cover clear evidence that the effects of ideological factors
Our work here is the first comprehensive, large-scale
are conditioned by strategic considerations. As the mestudy of the phenomenon of en banc review in the
U.S.
dian
tenure in circuits increases and judges' information

Courts of Appeals.31 In doing so, we have assembled
on the
majority preferences becomes clearer, the linkage bemost comprehensive data to date on the incidence tween
of en circuit ideological heterogeneity and the frequency
banc review, finding that the frequency with which
enbancs is diminished. This suggests that judges in the
of en
banc rehearings have occurred varies significantlyminority
across on a circuit-given good information about the

both time and circuits. Drawing from the attitudinal,
preferences of the majority-modify their panel behavior
strategic, and legal/organizational perspectives on in
indiresponse to avoid en banc rehearing. Evidence on the
vidual judicial behavior, we developed a set of integrated
operation of the strategic model in the Courts of Appeals
expectations regarding the causes of this macrolevelis variamixed, and the context of en banc rehearing may contion. While the significance of fixed effects for the stitute
circuits
a "most likely" test of the operation of the model,

indicates that we have not captured all the factors at
work,
but
our results indicate that the model passes the test.

the findings of our analysis are consistent with the operIt has also been suggested that, particularly in the Reaation of all three models.
gan/Bush era, new partisan majorities on a circuit have

Our results are clearly consistent with the operation
employed en bancs to reshape the law of the circuit in
of legal and organizational considerations in theaccord
use of
with their policy preferences. In fact, our analysis
finds no evidence of such a phenomenon, either across the
31In related research Giles, Walker, and Zorn (2006) analyze in
full range of data considered or within the Reagan/Bush

greater depth the process by which individual cases are chosen for
era alone. However, this result does not mean that Judge
en banc rehearing. While both studies examine the role of attitudes,
Wald's complaint about such a use of en bancs by the
strategy, and law on the use of en banc, our previous study examines
a 10-year period (1981-91) in a single circuit, the Fifth. This artinew partisan majority in her court was unfounded. First,
cle thus constitutes the next step in our research program focused

such partisan ideological behavior could have resulted in
an increased use of en bancs in some circuits and for

on the role of en banc in the federal judicial hierarchy. Read together,

the two papers provide an extensive and intensive examination of
this seldom-studied but important institutional device.
some regime changes, including the one associated with
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her remarks; our results simply demonstrate that such

Barrow, Deborah J., and Thomas G. Walker. 1988. A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics of
Judicial Reform. New Haven: Yale University Press.

behavior was not sufficiently systematic to be detected

in a large-scale aggregate analysis. Second, new majorities may have systematically used en bancs to adjust es-

Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago

tablished circuit policy to reflect their preferences, but if

such cases replaced other, perhaps less partisan cases on

Press.

Bennett, Steven, and Christine Pembroke. 1985-86. "'Mini' in

the agenda for en banc-that is, if the change was one of

Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices." Cleveland
State Law Review 34(4): 531-65.

the substance and not the frequency of en banc casesthat change would not be detectable here.

Blackstone, Bethany, and Susan Navarro. 2006. "Regime Change

and Decision-making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals." Pre-

Our results thus place the controversy concerning the

sented at the 2006 annual meeting of the Midwest Political

ideological use of en bancs by Republican circuit majorities in the Reagan/Bush era in a somewhat different light.

While such usage may have been more blatant during this

period or more openly discussed, our evidence suggests
that the influence of ideology on the use of en banc during

the 1980s was not unique, but instead is part of a long-

Science Conference.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1988. "Organized
Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court."
American Political Science Review 82(4): 1109-27.

Caldeira, Gregory A., John R. Wright, and Christopher
Zorn. 1999. "Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organiza-

standing, general pattern that has typified the Courts of
Appeals since the practice was adopted in 1942.
Finally, our results provide a rare look at discretionary

tion 15(3): 549-72.

Cameron, Charles M., JeffreyA. Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000.

"Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions."
American Political Science Review 94(1): 101-16.

agenda setting in the Courts of Appeals. Studies of agenda

setting at the Supreme Court have generally concluded
that the decision to grant certiorari is a mixture of legal,
strategic, and attitudinal factors (Caldeira, Wright, and

Zorn 1999; Epstein and Knight 1998; Segal and Spaeth
2002). Our results suggest that the use of en banc review

Cross, Frank. 1997. "Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance."
Northwestern University Law Review 92(1): 251-326.
Cross, Frank B., and Emerson H. Tiller. 1998. "Judicial Parti-

sanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing
on the Federal Courts of Appeals." Yale Law Journal 107(7):

in the Courts of Appeals is conditioned by a similar mixture of considerations. At the same time, it is evident by

the variation in the use of en banc left unexplained by
those factors that additional work needs to be done. In

particular, the importance of the circuit-level effects sug-

gests that circuit-specific contextual norms and practices

2155-76.

Edwards, Harry. 1998. "Collegiality and Decision Making on
the D.C. Circuit." Virginia Law Review 84(7): 1335-70.
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1998. The Choices Justices Make.

Washington, DC: CQ Press.
George, Tracey, and Michael Solimine. 2001. "Supreme Court

are also at work in determining the use of the en banc
procedure.32

Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc."
Supreme Court Economic Review 9: 171-204.

Giles, Micheal W., Virginia A. Hettinger, and Todd Peppers.
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